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How do Japanese and French firms in steel industry address the 
institutional change and the globalization?   
Employment adjustment and age management in a downsizing context 
 
Emilie LANCIANO♣ , Michio NITTA♠  
 
Since the 1960s, downsizing has become a mode of adjustment widely used by corporate 
managements in the face of changing markets and economic competition (Raveyre 2005, 
Fayolle 2005, Lefresne and Sauviat 2008). It is an organization conscious use of permanent 
personnel reductions in an attempt to improve its efficiency and/or effectiveness (Cascio, 
1993, Appelbaum, Close, Klasa, 1999, Freeman, 1999). Thus in various ways depending on 
the period and country in question, different management strategies have been applied in 
order to adjust human resources to company configurations and new work organisation 
systems.  
In particular, Steel industry has been engaged for a very long time in a downsizing process 
which has deeply transformed social and industrial relations, work and employment 
management.  Once, these industry was owned and managed by big national groups 
(sometimes public) and employed a lot of workers at different levels of qualification. Now, a 
large movement of concentration leads to the emergence of transnational leader. Steel 
industry has become more and more a footloose industry, with high technological level.    
 
In this context, age emerges as a criterion in decision-making and the selection of employees 
to be dismissed. The age management represents now the main way – and the cheapest 
one in the short term– to reduce and optimize the firm workforce, but also a crucial issue for 
the preservation of knowledge and skills, required by the activity. Supported to a 
considerable degree by government employment policy measures, the management of 
downsizing can be regarded in many cases as management by age. After several 
downsizing operations, firms must adopt now more flexible strategies which integrate the 
aging of workforce (with the retirement of baby- boom generation), and the question of 
transmission of skills.  
 
Numerous studies have investigated on organizational change and on different means to 
improve and optimize organizational efficiency. Specially, the question of efficiency of the 
decision to proceed to a downsizing (Appelbaum, Close, Klasa, 1999) and the conditions of 
these effectiveness on firm performances (Cascio, 1993, Chadwick and al., 2004, McKinley, 
1995) have been investigated. Others studies pointed out the effects of downsizing on 
individuals, particularly the “survivor syndrome” (Isabella, 1989, Maertz and al., 2010), on 
organizational climate.  
 
However, few investigations treat the downsizing process as a recurrent event in some 
organization, which tends to affect structure and employment practices. In deed, the majority 
of studies considers downsizing as a special event, which belongs to the short term. The 
mid- or long- term effects on the structure (Freeman, 1999) are neglected. It doesn’t 
represent anymore a special event, but it tends to be a recurrent mean to proceed to 
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adjustment and change. Corporate restructurings have become a ‘commonplace’ indeed 
almost a ‘natural’ phenomenon and large companies are now ‘permanently engaged in 
restructuring (Raveyre, 2005), to the point where it is possible to speak of restructuring 
processes. Whereas most writing emphasizes either the methods by which organizations 
reduce their size, there has been relatively little investigation about the links between 
downsizing and restructuring defined as a organizational redesign in a long term perspective.  
A long term perspective is so very useful to understand how firms and organizations manage 
organizational change by reducing workforce and how does it affect firm structure and the 
work system. 
 
Second, the main literature tends to treat the problematic of downsizing, with the single focus 
of the firm. At the different stapes of the downsizing process, several heterogeneous 
resources are mobilized: public actors, financial actors and shareholders. Governments are 
said to have encouraged and taken part in these changes, which have given rise to 
significant tangible and intangible investments. New competitive context contributes to 
change the nature of actors engaged in these process.  Until a few years ago, the 
management of downsizing appeared to be a process organised by company management 
but in which the state, and others actors as shareholders, in various guises and in various 
ways, played an important role. In recent years, it has withdrawn and financial actors have 
become the principal players, leading to the adoption of a least cost strategy. 
In this perspective, organizations, and specially work system, are considered as institutional 
entities: work groups, departments, plants, enterprises, public agencies. (Sorge, 2004). It 
doesn’t mean that institutions are external factors which affect organization and work system. 
Work system and Human Resource Management are embedded into a national and 
international wide of social relation they contribute to change. Downsizing practices tends so 
to change the nature of these relations, inside the organization but also in the whole society. 
Then, downsizing can be understood more broadly as a long process which influences the 
wage-labour nexus in society and the management of work and employment (Rolle 2004, 
2006) in firms.  
 
French and Japanese firms have been characterised by the important literature by the 
peculiar employment system and practices, and the dominance of Internal Labour Markets1 
(Doeringer and Piore 1971). Organizations define their own work system which tends to 
privilege long life career, internal mobility and training.  In these employment systems, 
institutions play a decisive role in the organisation and structuring of the productive system 
(Whitley, 1994, Lanciano-Morandat, Maurice, Silvestre, Nohara, 1998).  
 
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the assumption of the change of these 
peculiar employment systems in a context of institutional change and globalization. The 
question is how age management used to proceed to employment adjustment affects the 
specific work organization of Japanese and French firms, and finally contributes to the 
destabilization and the reconfiguration of internal labour markets. We outline and compare 
the evolution of these age-based management strategies and practices in two steel 
companies, one French, the other Japanese. Both of them have been involved since the mid-
1970s in permanent downsizing processes. This analysis should enable us to examine the 
different ways in which firms manage the downsizing process in a long term perspective, and 
the transmission of knowledge and expertise from one generation to another in this difficult 
environment (Le Roux, 2006, Gautié et al. 2006, Lanciano-Morandat, Maurice, Silvestre, 
Nohara, 1998).  We will consider changes that have occurred in traditional institutionalised 
work management, and finally in internal labour markets (Doering and Piore 1971, Nohara 
and Silvestre 1986, Marsden 1999, Lefresne 2002, Gautié 2004) in periods of economic 
crisis. 
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We decide to focus on a heavy industry with a long tradition, despite the fact that researchers 
in the social sciences today tend to be more interested in high-technology industries. For the 
last 30 years, the steel industry has been engaged in a transition from a method of 
production based on a workforce for whom physical strength was essential to one that makes 
extensive use of robots and in which the machinery has evolved to such an extent that a high 
level of technical knowledge and expertise is now required. It is a cyclical industry, but one in 
which the periods of growth and recession have until recently been predictable and could 
therefore be anticipated. However, ever since the advent of strong competition from 
emerging countries with lower labour costs than those in France and Japan, this type of 
prediction has become more uncertain. The most recent crisis in 2009 has hit the industry 
hard in both France and Japan, causing the two plants under investigation here to carry out 
new adjustments. 
 
These two plants have a parallel history. They both belong to the steel manufacturing group 
that dominates the sector in their respective countries. They were both built on the coast in 
the early 1970s and a large part of their workforce was transferred from the interior of the 
country to work in the new plants, which were then ultra-modern. While their early histories 
are very similar, their trajectories have diverged over time. 
 
1- Downsizing and age Human Resource Management  
 
1-1. How to proceed to improve organizational efficiency? Two generic strategies  
 
Firms engaged in a process to improve organizational efficiency adopt different kinds of 
human resource management strategies. These strategies are linked directly to the aims of 
the organizational change and the external resources available to the firm, notably in terms 
of public programmes. The strategy involves applying the cost reduction targets within the 
company and adapting work and workforce organisation to the company’s overall strategy. 
Consequently, the downsizing plan must both fulfil the short-term objectives that are the 
reason for reorganising work and employment and maintain the company’s medium and 
long-term prospects, particularly during periods of economic downturn. Thus it is important to 
consider the practices associated with downsizing and the adjustment of employment to 
firms’ economic situation over a sufficiently long period in order take into account the effects 
of decisions taken at a specific point in time and assess the effectiveness of the measures 
taken.  
 
Different generic strategies have been identified by the literature to conduct employment 
adjustment:  
- External quantitative flexibility, the aim of which is to reduce the stock of 
human resources recruited during earlier periods. In these case, several 
studies make the difference between downsizing, which corresponds to a 
response to a situation of declining market, and restructuring in case of 
growing or shifting market strategy2 (Appelbaum and al., 1999, Leatt and al, 
1997). However, for Freeman, downsizing is not necessarily indicative of 
decline or mal-adaptation. (Freeman, 1999) 
- and internal qualitative flexibility, the aim of which is to change the internal 
employment structure on the basis of forecasts and strategic positioning. It 
corresponds to “redesign”, which includes “change in work processes, in 
relationships and coordination among individuals, teams, departments, or 
tasks, or in specification or distribution of tasks.” (Freeman, op. cit.)  
 
 
                                                 
2
 Anglosaxon literature makes the distinction while French one not. Restructuring can represent both reduce 
workforce and redesign; the term is also linked to public intervention dispositives.   
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These two generic strategies tend to use different resources. The reducing workforce 
strategy consists to externalise the redundant workforce on the external labour market on the 
firm. Different possibilities exist: using part-time employees instead of permanent ones, lay 
offs, early retirement for some individuals, etc… In these case, the State in its capacity as 
regulator of labour market and of the arrangements for managing pension benefits and 
compensation is mobilized. It determines the conditions under which workers can be made 
redundant, the compensation they receive, unemployment benefits, training grants for firms, 
the modes of payment, activation date for pension rights etc. Similarly, the state can support 
firms’ strategies by putting in place measures to accelerate workers’ retirement. Otherwise, 
internal qualitative flexibility consists to operate changes in the internal labour market; 
organization is the main actor to proceed to a new job rotation, job hierarchy.   
 
In the context of an increasingly uncertain economic environment the task of designing and 
implementing managerial policy is becoming more and more complex. The ability of 
managers to choose from a range of potential solutions to questions of workforce planning 
seems to have increasing enormously (Grisham and al., 2001). These two forms of flexibility 
doesn’t represent different strategies of employment adjustment, but are usually combined 
and involve selecting those groups in the employed population that will be the principal target 
of any measures taken and will be destined to leave the firm. Precisely, Freeman shows that 
these two strategies are linked and interdependent (Freeman, 1999). Freeman emphasizes 
two different cases:  
- when downsizing drives the redesign of work and obliges organisation to 
proceed to change in order to do the same thing with fewer people.  
- Otherwise, redesign strategy may conduct the firm to reduce the workforce. 
 
1-2. How to proceed to the selection of redundant workforce? Organizational change as an 
age management   
 
Thus company managements have two main means of carrying out this selection process 
and identifying who is to be made redundant or to leave the company. The selection is 
determined by the reasons for the restructuring and the time management has to make its 
decisions, as well as by the external resources and public programmes available to the firm:  
 
- The restructuring may be carried out in order to refocus a company’s operations on its core 
business. Such a strategy requires management to have given thought to the firm’s future 
technological trajectory and mode of work organisation and to know its employees’ current 
capabilities and the potential for development. In this case, the selection process focuses on 
those individuals with the competences closest to those being sought.   
 
 
Downsizing 
Restructuring 
Reducing 
workforce 
External 
quantitative 
flexibility 
External 
labour 
market 
Public 
intervention  
 
 
 
 
How to improve 
organizational 
efficiency? 
Re-engineering Redesign of 
work 
Internal 
qualitative 
flexibility 
Internal 
labour 
market 
Organization  
 
 
(Appelbaum 
and al, 1999)   
(Doeringer 
and Piore 
1972) 
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- Managing restructuring on the basis of age (Godelier, 2007) generally offers many more 
advantages and is the variable favoured by corporate managers. It places age at the heart of 
the arrangements for managing overmanning; more specifically, it makes the oldest and 
therefore probably the most experienced workers the main adjustment variable. This strategy 
involves less linkage with the firm’s overall policy than the previous one and less need to 
anticipate the evolution of the crisis. 
After all, the departure of large numbers of workers in the oldest age group makes it possible 
to fulfil many of the objectives of a restructuring exercise: 
- the cost reduction targets are more easily attained because the target 
population is precisely the one that is most expensive for the firm to employ; 
- the departure of the oldest employees may be an opportunity to introduce 
greater internal qualitative flexibility. A younger population is likely to be better 
trained and to adapt more readily to technical progress (Gautié et al. 2006); 
- the lines of authority and responsibility are shortened, which may create more 
opportunities for promoting younger employees to positions of responsibility;   
- finally, age-based management enables company managements to minimise 
trade union reaction and reduce the risk of a deterioration in the firm’s 
industrial relations climate.  
 
These different ways of reducing labour costs have been used in both countries in their 
restructuring processes. Nevertheless, as maximising financial profitability has become the 
overriding concern, so the time available to management for planning has been reduced and 
firms are increasingly being encouraged to adapt age-based management. This new context 
also concerns the public regulatory bodies, which are also subject to increased financial 
constraints. They have reduced the support they give firms in order to reduce the cost of 
restructurings (tendency to increase the age at which employees can be made 
redundant/take retirement, to make it more difficult to have applications accepted and to 
reduce the level of financial support provided)  (Benallah et al., 2009).   
 
1-3. …towards a destabilisation of boundaries of internal markets and work systems  
 
The age-based management of downsizing processes raises the question of firms’ human 
resource management policies and modes of intergenerational knowledge transfer (Le Roux, 
2006, Gautié et ii 2006) and gives a few indications about the evolution of internal labour 
markets and its boundaries. After all, over and above the management of overstaffing, those 
policies have a particular impact on recruitment strategies, training activities and the 
adaptation of the workforce to the changes taking place in the firm. 
 
French and Japanese firms are used to be characterised by the strength of their internal 
labour markets (Doeringer and Piore 1971), particularly because of their management of 
labour mobility and the level of deferred wages. Internal labor markets can be defined as “an 
administrative unit within a firm in which pricing and allocation of labor is governed by a set of 
administrative rules and procedures”. (Doeringer, Piore, op.cit) The remainder of jobs within 
the ILM is filled by the promotion or transfer of workers who have already gained entry. At the 
opposite, external labour market corresponds to a work organisation regulated by market 
rules (inter-firm mobility, recruitments at every level of the job hierarchy, wages fixed on 
national and international standards, etc.) .  
 
Thus before the crisis, Japanese firms used to recruit, once a year, a cohort of young people 
selected on the basis of the reputation of the educational establishments from which they 
had graduated. These young recruits were regarded as a standard product, and the generic 
knowledge and expertise they were expected to acquire were specified throughout the 
course of their professional lives in accordance with their employers’ training needs and 
dispensed through explicit vocational training programmes and on-the-job training. In both 
countries, mobility was internal and, for the clerical, technical and supervisory staff category 
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in France, was restricted to the site at which they worked, while in Japan it extended to 
subsidiaries. Seniority was the essential criterion for promotion. In Japan, knowledge transfer 
was codified in accordance with strict rules laid down by company management and took 
place in a systematic fashion. In France, firms hired a product that had already been graded 
by the education system and adapted it as their requirements evolved. The transmission of 
professional practices (apprenticeship) took place tacitly and informally on the basis of the 
assumed relationship between young and old without intervention on the part of 
management (Lanciano et al., 1998). Steelmaking companies belonged to this industrial 
world where, regardless of how their efficiency evolved, older workers could be relatively 
confident that their earnings would continue to rise until the statutory retirement age.   
 
Successive crises have radically changed these internal markets and destabilised them. The 
growing use of temporary employment practices, external recruitment of specialist staff 
would reduce the strength of labour markets in favour of the external one. In some countries, 
‘the early departure culture’ (Guillemard 2003) has spread to the entire firm, making workers’ 
age and seniority no longer a source of accumulated experience but the primary indicator of 
departure to the external labour market or into retirement.  
Numerous studies investigate the question of the permanence of internal employment 
practices (Grimshaw and al., 2001, Gautié, 2004). The assumption of the destabilization of 
ILM doesn’t consist to deny the existence of ILM, but rather to observe the new boundaries 
between external and internal labour markets (Cappeli, 1997, Grimshaw and Ribery, 1998):  
Markets rules would be also now present even in organizations and employment system 
dominated before by the logics of internal labour markets. Thus Florence Dufresne (2003) 
shows that external markets have ‘embedded’ themselves within internal markets and 
introduced competition among employees within firms. Luc Behagen and Jérome Gautié 
(2006) show how it is in firms’ interest that older workers who used to be in an internal labour 
market are redeployed to a new area of activity and hence into the transitional market 
(Gazier, 1998). 
 
Our analysis should reveal how the internal labour markets in the two steelmaking 
companies have evolved. The succession of downsizing processes and the use of mixed 
strategy combining a reducing workforce and a redesign, the focus of these mixed strategies 
on the age criterion should contribute to shift the work system of organizations and the 
relation between internal and external labour market.  
 
2- Downsizing processes in France and Japan: differences in pace and focus  
 
The two steel plants were set up under similar conditions. They both belong to their 
countries’ national champions in the sector. Technological developments, the decision to 
stop using the local iron ore (known as minette in Lorraine) in the production of steel and the 
high cost of coal mined in France compared with that extracted in emerging countries led 
these groups gradually to shut down their old plants in favour of new, more modern ones 
located on the coast (‘steel on sea’) so that the exported raw materials could be unloaded at 
a nearby port. The two plants date from the beginning of the 1970s and were built in ‘empty 
spaces’ without any industrial tradition that had until then been given over to agriculture and 
fishing. The local labour force was made up largely of self-employed craftsmen with no 
experience of wage work. Although the sites were developed in order to provide the modern 
plant and equipment required for new projects, many of the workers from the old plants were 
‘deported’ to the new centres, which meant they could be brought into operation quickly. 
Another characteristic shared by the two plants is that since they were built they have 
undergone a series of restructurings that justify our description of the phenomenon or 
process as ‘commonplace’. 
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The histories of the two plants at Fos-sur-Mer and Kimitsu in Japan3 are marked by extensive 
and repeated downsizing processes. However, their integration into specific national 
industrial systems explains the persistence of differences in the origin and nature of these 
processes. (Sorge, 2004)  
 
2-3. Fos-sur-Mer: a steel plant shaped by the conditions under which it was established 
and changes in its capital structure  
 
The restructuring processes that have characterised the history of the Fos-sur-Mer plant are 
a direct result of the conditions under which it was set up in 1973 and of the changes in the 
company’s status with the gradual withdrawal of the state, globalisation and the 
financialisation of its capital structure.  
The Fos-sur-Mer plant dates from 1972 and its construction was part of an ambitious 
industrial project that was national in scale. After the post-war reconstruction period, the aim 
was to strengthen France’s industrial champions and to equip them with modern plant and 
equipment. The Fos-sur-mer project also fell within the ‘industrialising industry’ paradigm, 
according to which the development of heavy industry leads to the creation of new light 
industries; in this case, the government was looking for a testing ground to put into practice 
its new doctrine of ‘regional development’ (Bisanti, 2003). Just a few years before the first oil 
shock, the plan’s ambitions in terms of productive capacities were considerable and the aim, 
in constructing a plant on the coast, in imitation of the Japanese steel industry, was to 
reinvigorate the French iron and steel industry, which had traditionally been located in 
Lorraine in eastern France. Thus both the state and the company were ‘thinking big’: the 
plant was to have three blast furnaces, a coking plant and a hot and cold rolling mill 
producing an annual output of 3 million tonnes of steel. The workforce was to number 3500 
direct and of the order of 2000 indirect employees.  However, scarcely had the plant been 
partially completed when the oil crisis suddenly erupted, calling into question the original plan 
and its ambitious aims: the third blast furnace was never built and the cold rolling mill was 
abandoned. The planned manning levels were never to match actual requirements.  
 
The Fos-sur-mer site perfectly illustrates the major changes this heavy industry has been 
through in France. Firm F is, after all, the result of the many divisions and mergers that have 
taken place in the French iron and steel industry since the end of the Second World War. 
These restructurings were initiated by the state as part of its efforts to build up a coherent 
national system, if not a single national champion. The various companies that emerged from 
the ‘ironmasters’ were still in competition with each other when firm F was set up in Fos as a 
production cooperative working for three major European groups. From this date onwards, 
two major periods can be identified: the first one, up to 2006, was characterised by industrial 
downsizing, the second, from 2006 onwards, by financial downsizing. 
Within the first period, we will focus on two sub-periods:  
• from 1978 to 1995, the period of greatest state influence. In 1978, the state took 
control of firm F. In 1982, it nationalised the two French iron and steel groups and 
merged them in 1987. Through the many changes it initiated and the holdings it took, 
the state settled the firm’s debts and took responsibility for managing the effects of 
the various recessions and industrial crises. The restructurings were as much a 
response to the various crises the industry went through during this period as a 
reflection of the various national industrial strategies. 
• In 1995, firm F was privatised and the Fos plant was incorporated into the flat carbon 
division. It is the main plant in the flat products division and produces solely for the 
group of which it is a part. In 2002, the renamed group merged with a Spanish and a 
Luxembourg company to form a new group, the largest steel producer in the world. 
Having been a national champion, it had become part of a European group. 
  
                                                 
3
 For reasons of confidentiality, we will call the French plant firm F and the Japanese plant firm J. 
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The financial downsizing began when firm F was acquired by an Indian group and became 
firm F-I. The F-I group, whose majority shareholder is an Indian industrialist, owns more than 
60 production plants throughout the world. The Fos plant is in direct competition with the 
group’s other plants, and the drive to achieve the lowest possible cost has become the main 
cause of the restructurings. 
 
During the period of industrial downsizing, the production facilities, which were some of the 
most modern in Europe, were continuously being modernised. The high point came in 1982, 
with the abandonment of the ingot mill and the adoption of continuous casting, which 
equated to the introduction of a fifth shift. This technical innovation was followed by others, 
which led to a series of reorganisations of the work process. Production procedures became 
automated; as a result, the heavy physical work associated with earlier technologies 
disappeared, to be replaced by monitoring and control tasks, usually carried out at a 
computer screen. 
 
2-4. The Kimitsu plant: an ultra-modern Japanese champion sensitive to cyclical 
fluctuations and integrated into the Japanese industrial system 
 
The history of the Japanese Kimitsu plant is significantly different from that of the Fos plant in 
France.  Kimitsu, built in 1968, is located at the mouth of Tokyo Bay and is one of the second 
generation of innovative plants built on the coast. It is part of the Japanese J group, the 
second largest steel producer in the world, after the F-I group. It is now one of the largest 
Japanese steel plants, producing 10,000,000 tonnes of steel a year. It has two blast furnaces 
and employs 3,500 people, with a further 6,000 working for subcontractors.    
Two of the most striking characteristics of the Japanese iron and steel industry and the 
Kimitsu plant are the absence of mineral resources and the very high degree of sensitivity to 
the global economic situation. These are two of the main factors in the development of plants 
making use of innovative technologies. 
In contrast to France, Japan has no mineral resources and therefore has to import the coal 
required to produce steel. In order to counteract the absence of mineral resources, 
steelmaking in Japan developed from the 1950s onwards through the construction of plants 
using the most advanced and innovative technologies. Japan was the first country to adopt 
the model in which integrated steel plants, such as the Kimitsu plant, are built on reclaimed 
land at the far end of a bay that can be accessed by large ore carriers. The model then 
spread throughout the world, as can be seen in the case of the Fos plant.  
Furthermore, steelmaking in Japan has long been characterised by a very high degree of 
integration with the Japanese industrial system. The post-war period saw the Japanese steel 
industry develop very rapidly and very efficiently. The impetus for its development came from 
the state and private interests working together in the name of economic voluntarism and 
nationalism. Their objective was to support the growth of Japanese manufacturing industry, 
to contribute to the country’s post-war economic reconstruction and to respond to the 
economic imperialism that was manifesting itself in Japan. The industry’s development was 
characterised by a very high level of integration with the rest of the Japanese industrial 
system. It developed and continues to maintain very close links with its customers, 
particularly in the automotive industry. Production processes have long been designed by 
taking account at a very early stage of specific requests made by customers, the vast 
majority of whom are Japanese. The involvement of the state and the public authorities does 
not take the forms of direct capital holdings, as it does in France; however, the steel industry 
is strongly represented within the powerful Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and is 
protected by the large subsidies that are granted in order to support this strategic sector of 
Japanese capitalism.  
 
This particular configuration of sensitivity to the global economic situation and a high level of 
integration with the Japanese industrial system has not protected the Kimitsu plant from 
economic crises and restructurings. As in the case of Fos-sur-Mer, the plant’s history is 
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punctuated by recurrent crises that have led to extensive restructuring. Nevertheless, in the 
case of the Japanese plants, these restructurings have resulted largely from deteriorations in 
the global and/or Japanese economic situation, including the two oil shocks and the Plaza 
agreements, which had a seriously adverse effect on the whole of the Japanese economy in 
the mid-1980s. 
 
These crises repeatedly forced the company management to implement major changes to 
production processes and work organisation. The company and the Kimitsu plant were 
particularly affected by extensive and recurrent restructurings from the 1980s onwards. The 
first restructuring took place in 1985, at the time of the Plaza agreements that seriously 
overvalued the Japanese currency and severely reduced the competitiveness of the whole of 
the Japanese manufacturing sector. The second took place in the 1990s, during the period of 
economic stagnation. There has been a constant tendency to rationalise activity at the plant 
in the course of successive crises. The first objective of the strategy implemented by the 
company as it tried to adjust to changes in the steel industry’s economic situation after the 
1980s was to close inefficient plants and increase productivity by investing in modern 
facilities, thereby lowering costs.  In particular, the medium-term plan drawn up in 1987 
triggered a large-scale rationalisation programme. According to this plan, 5 of the 15 blast 
furnaces operated by company J at the time had to be closed down. Since then, the 
company has operated 10 blast furnaces at six sites, three of them at Kimitsu. The period 
between 1987 and 1993 was characterised by successive shutdowns of blast furnaces, the 
concentration of production facilities and a painful reduction in the size of the workforce.  
Finally, the tendency towards concentration that has been at work globally in the steel 
industry since the beginning of the new century and which has led to the emergence of large 
international groups (such as Arcelor Mittal) has played out in a fairly specific way in the 
Japanese steel industry. The concentration of capital has taken place strictly within Japan’s 
national boundaries, with the Japanese steel firms gathered together under the umbrella of a 
holding company. Under strong government pressure, the four main Japanese steel firms 
formed themselves in 2002 into a wholly Japanese owned holding company. 
On the other hand, the first decade of the 21st century saw a change in the close ties 
between the steel and automotive industries, and Nissan in particular. Up to this point, the 
steel industry had worked for the automotive industry on the basis of stable, long-term 
contracts. However, the new management at Nissan imposed new competitive margins, 
forcing the steelmakers to reduce costs once again.  
 
Ever since they were first set up, these two firms have been engaged in continuous 
restructuring processes. However, the causes of these restructurings are different. Although 
the international competitive environment certainly played its part, those carried out in France 
were responses to changes in the company’s capital structure and industrial strategy and, 
more recently, the globalisation of its shareholders. The Japanese company has not 
experienced any significant changes in its capital composition; in this case, the different 
downsizing were responses to macroeconomic shocks affecting the Japanese economy as a 
whole. These two downsizing trajectories recently converged when the 2009 crisis erupted, 
affecting both companies in similar ways. The sharp reduction in activity and order books – 
which became apparent at a very early stage of the crisis – caused both companies to speed 
up cyclical and structural adjustment measures.    
   
3- Age-based management: a tool used in downsizing 
 
3-3. Changes in size of workforce 
 
Both Japanese and French plants face to an unstable environment which obliges it to adapt 
and to proceed to employment adjustment. These downsizing processes has been conduct 
in different ways. The French plant has been focused on constant reduction of workforce 
which obliges it to proceed to several change in the work organization. The Japanese plant 
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has favoured redesign measures which have permitted to stabilize the workforce in 
proceeding to important organizational change.   
 
3-1-1. Constant reduction in employment at Fos  
 
The evolution of employment levels at the Fos plant since it was first established clearly 
reveals the sudden change in strategy caused by the crisis and the reconfiguration of the site 
and its production capacity. The period following the plant’s construction naturally saw an 
increase in employment levels. Between 1972 and 1978, the number of employees 
increased more than tenfold. On the other hand, the effects of the 1973 oil shock and the 
reconfiguration of the site did not make themselves felt until later, and it was some time 
before employment levels began to fall. However, from 1978 onwards, the size of the 
workforce was to be in continuous decline, at different rates depending on the period. By 
2008, the plant was employing slightly more than 3000 people, less than in 1973, the first 
year of operation, and virtually half the number of people employed in 1978. Overall, the 
effects of forecasting errors were always to be the explanation for the continuous reduction in 
employment levels from that date onwards. 
The high aspirations that accompanied the construction of the plant were made possible 
during the early years of its operation by the transfer of experienced workers from Lorraine 
(in the 1970s they accounted for two thirds of the workforce) and the recruitment on 
permanent contracts of unskilled and inexperienced young workers from the Fos area. The 
transfers of workers from Lorraine were to decline gradually without stopping altogether; 
particular peaks coincided with the closure of some of the company’s other plants. 
 
Evolution of the workforce at Fos/mer Plant from 1972 to 2008
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
Fos/mer 
 
Workers were recruited on fixed-term contracts during the start-up phase in 1978 and 
between 1990 and 1994 in order to replace employees originally from Lorraine who were 
retiring. From 2006 onwards, recruitment on fixed-term contracts took place simultaneously 
with the recruitment of permanent staff in order to limit risks in the event of recession. This 
slight increase in recruitment coincided with the acquisition of Arcelor by Mittal. 
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Evolution of recruitment on fixed-term/permanent contracts
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3-1-2. More stable employment levels at Kimitsu  
 
Employment levels at the Kimitsu plant are the same as they were when it first opened. 
Nevertheless, the 1990s saw large numbers of compulsory redundancies, which took 
employment levels back to what they were when the plant first opened. Although pressure to 
reduce employment levels has certainly been one of the factors driving the restructurings in 
Japan, their main objective has been to rationalise work organisation and production 
processes. Workforce size has been stabilised, but its structure has been considerably 
altered over time. Moreover, in contrast to Fos, the firm has not stopped recruiting at any 
time, except at a few particularly critical junctures.   
 
Evolution of employment levels at the Kimitsu plant from 1990 to 
2008
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Thus the reductions in employment levels and the various processes of work rationalisation 
are a recurrent feature and constituent element of these two firms’ employment management 
policies. Particularly in the case of the Fos plant, the objective of employment management 
since the plant was opened has been to deal with the overmanning caused by inaccurate 
initial forecasts. At the Kimitsu plant, employment management has mainly involved 
organising and rationalising the work process in order to cope with turbulence in the 
Japanese economy. In both cases, implementation of these restructuring processes and 
employment management practices has been based on management by age. 
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3-4. Management of employment levels by age  
 
When they were set up, both plants recruited large numbers of relatively unskilled workers 
from the same age group (born in the early 1950s). These young people were recruited 
straight from school and trained on the job by the older workers transferred from the old 
plants. Their age pyramids were similar to that described as a ‘squashed pear’ in the 
literature (Godelier 2007), in which recruitment takes place only when the firm is first set up 
but dries up subsequently. Depending on the period and in different ways, management 
strategy at the two plants has been to alternate measures aimed at reducing the surplus of 
older workers while at the same time recruiting young workers with other measures intended 
to maintain the status quo. They have used different methods and drawn on different external 
resources. 
 
3-1. The management of surplus labour through early retirement schemes for older 
workers and the individualisation of career management  
 
From the early 1970s at national level and from 1978 onwards at Fos, the French 
steelmaking industry was forced to make drastic reductions in its employment levels if it was 
to survive in the face of European competition. To that end, the company’s managers have 
throughout the plant’s history systematically favoured the use of early retirement of their 
oldest employees. Early retirement has been preferred to redundancy programmes and has 
enabled management essentially to solve the problem of overmanning (Atlan, Simon, 2000). 
The early retirement schemes have been advantageous for both employees and the 
company. Until 1990, the schemes were largely funded by the state. At the same time, new 
employees were recruited only on an individual basis. Faced with this management strategy, 
the unions adopted a ‘follow-my-leader’ position: it was difficult for them to go against the 
wishes of workers already in post, even though, by not opposing the early retirement 
schemes, they were relinquishing any attempt to defend future employees and the local area. 
Until 1990, at Fos just as in the rest of the country, the various measures co-funded by the 
state, including the Conventions Générales de Protection Sociale (general social protection 
agreements), the Plan de Sauvegardes (recovery plan) and others, enabled manual workers 
and employees in the clerical, technical and supervisory staff category to retire at 50, with 
engineers drawing a pension of 92% of their previous salary.4  This early retirement policy 
had the advantage of sharply reducing the company’s wages bill while at the same time 
enabling management to increase the number of promotion opportunities, which made the 
changes in work organisation acceptable for the remaining employees and improved the 
industrial relations climate within the company. On the other hand, the financial support 
provided by the state came with certain conditions attached. In particular, the company had 
to use the state manpower services when recruiting.  
 
In 1990, the public authorities cut the level of financial support, which put a halt to the large-
scale retirement programmes for workers aged 50 and over. These cuts caused the firm to 
change its practices. 
• From this point onwards, the firm began to make use of plans sociaux (redundancy 
programmes), which were more restrictive and less advantageous for employees. It put in 
place a strategy of outplacement and spin-offs within the region based on companies set up 
for that purpose by the group (so-called SODIE, or sociétés pour le développement de 
l’industrie et de l’emploi), which incidentally had very little effect (Centlivre, 2001).  
 
• Above all, however, the firm made a significant and innovative change to its mode of 
employee management. Indeed, it was in the steel industry that the shift from job-based to 
                                                 
4
 Atlan, the Usinor HR director at the time, notes that ‘since Usinor had made a loss in 1993, pay had 
been frozen; but during the same year, those who had taken early retirement had seen their benefits 
rise by 3% because they were indexed to the national minimum wage …’. 
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competence-based human resource management originated, before being diffused 
nationally. In the job-based system, a worker’s certified skills were nationally recognised and 
qualified him to hold a job in any steel plant in France; in the competence-based system, on 
the other hand, the competences in question were those required by individual firms. 
Whereas the previous system had been based on a collective approach and sought to 
integrate workers into the external labour market (national-level certification), the new system 
targeted the individual and sought to make the internal labour market more flexible (firm-
based certification).  In the new system, employees had to take charge of their own 
professional development and be able, if need be, to find themselves employment in the 
external market. They alone were responsible for their careers. Previously, the boss of the 
company that had hired them had a responsibility for their future and for that of the local 
industrial fabric; now employees were ‘independent’ operators, working within an 
organisation over which they had no control The tools provided by the company 
management were supposed to help employees effect this change, but as the certifiers of 
their own competence within the plant. This strategy was undoubtedly helpful to 
management, since it encouraged internal mobility of labour and the diffusion of knowledge 
and expertise and increased the flexibility of the production system. However, questions 
must be asked about its value in a period of crisis and contraction of the productive system 
and the wage bill. It enabled the group management to compensate for the reduction in the 
number of promotion opportunities caused by the decline in early retirement by offering 
promotion to selected individuals (Gavini, 1993).  
 
Finally, the crisis management principle of pensioning off the oldest employees has once 
again been put into practice in the recent crisis. Having recruited new workers following the 
acquisition of the company, the international group management, driven by financial 
concerns, adopted a drastic labour cost reduction strategy. The plan specified the number of 
jobs to be lost between 2009 and the spring of 2010. It mainly affects blue-collar workers. In 
order to meet its target, the management of the French plant opted once again for an age-
based measure that offers voluntary early retirement on very advantageous terms to blue-
collar workers aged 56 and over. In order to limit the risk of future redundancies, the plant 
manager has extended the scheme to all employees. The scheme has been so successful 
that when it closes in February 2010, more than 15% of the workforce will have opted for 
early retirement and the group management’s targets will have very largely been met. This 
new scheme is absolutely consistent with previous ones in that it adopts age as a criterion for 
reducing wage costs. On the other hand, unlike previous schemes, the present one does not 
involve any state support or measures linked to a social plan. It is funded entirely by the 
company, which therefore has complete freedom to determine the targets.  
 
Thus despite changes in the rationale of the restructurings, in capital structure and in the 
nature of the crises to be dealt with, comparison of the ways of managing restructuring at the 
Fos plant over time reveals a considerable degree of continuity in the management of 
overmanning. More specifically, workers have been strongly encouraged to leave the 
company and take advantage of their pension entitlements. By taking such measures, the 
company has automatically and effectively reduced its wages bill. At the same time, 
however, these measures have deprived the company and its human resources department 
of the ability to adopt a forward-looking approach to the management of employment. On 
each occasion, the measures taken have adopted age as the sole criterion, with all 
employees meeting that criterion being able to take advantage of the programmes put in 
place. Despite the differences between them, all these programmes have prevented the firm 
from selecting candidates for severance on the basis of other criteria, such as the nature of 
work organisation, skill levels and future prospects. In fact, human resource management 
has here been reduced to a simple tool for managing entries and exits and a set of tools for 
use by employees. As a result, it has lost its workforce management function.     
The competence-based approach adopted from 1990 onwards has its origins in the same 
principle. What it amounts to, after all, is a transfer of responsibility for career management to 
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the individual worker, with the firm, through its HR department, offloading the task of 
organising employment.  
 
3-2. The case of the Kimitsu plant 
 
The restructuring exercises carried out at the Kimitsu plant on Tokyo Bay also took age as 
the criterion, but with different objectives. The company management was always seeking to 
maintain the Japanese social compromise of lifetime employment and thus to minimise 
compulsory redundancies. Consequently, working in direct partnership with the company 
union, management put in place a number of measures that marked an innovative departure 
from standard practice in Japanese manufacturing and the steel industry, focusing in 
particular on older workers. (Nitta,1995).  
The aims were to increase internal flexibility through work rationalisation; in particular, young 
workers were to be favoured over their older colleagues, on the one hand because they were 
regarded as more amenable to change and, on the other, in order to reduce the firm’s wages 
bill. Thus the measures taken were focused in particular on the modes of remuneration for 
older workers and their conditions of employment.   
Employee remuneration was systematically and significantly reduced from age 55 onwards, 
in order to reduce the company’s wages bill. At the same time, the practice known as 
‘shukko’, that is the transfer of older workers to a subcontracting firm, was established. It 
involves the secondment of workers to another, generally smaller company, but without their 
contracts with the original employer being rescinded. Employees continue to draw their 
wages and the bonuses paid by the original employer; for its part, the host firm benefits from 
the arrival of the new workers and pays a contribution in exchange. Thus the aim is to filter 
out the least productive and profitable employees while stopping short of expelling them 
directly from the workings of the internal labour market.   
The procedures are not just monetary or economic but also demand extensive efforts and 
energy from the parent company.  For example, it is necessary to find a company that will not 
only accept such a loaned employee but will also provide the services necessary to reduce 
employee dissatisfaction and indirectly monitor job performance for evaluation purposes, 
since the parent company's employment system is still in effect functioning. Thus the outlay 
on human resource management is considerable, in terms of both cost and effort. 
        The employee loan process is not without its problems for the person who is being 
loaned.  Even though income is guaranteed, there is a real possibility of being assigned work 
different from the previous job.  The disruption of human relationships causes great pain.  
The work place may also become less desirable.  There may also be potential human 
resource management problems for the companies accepting these loaned employees, 
especially if they maintain a loyalty to their former companies.   
        In spite of these problems, a large scale loan procedure was chosen as a last resort in 
order to avoid dismissal and "voluntary retirement."  Many of the workers concerned were in 
their 50s, and they were rather senior workers. The average age within the company was 
about 42 for the employees who worked at the site, however it was about 52 for those who 
were loaned from the major companies.  There are several reasons for such an age 
distinction. Firstly, many of this age group were in leadership positions, which were to be 
given to younger employees as promotional opportunities. Secondly, the employee age 
distribution was uneven due to the maturation process after the 1970s and the reduction in 
recruitment (small numbers of employees in their 30s were hired).  Thus if younger workers 
had been loaned, skills would not have been properly transferred to the next generation.  
However, older workers earn the highest wages and therefore there tends to be a large gap 
between previous wages levels and those earned at the new company.  Their ability to adapt 
to a new environment is relatively low.  These factors highlight the contradictions associated 
with the loan process.  
        In the labour reduction plan which was put into practice in the restructuring that 
occurred after 1992, some of the loaned workers also transferred their status.  That is, they 
officially retired from their former employer and transferred to employee status at the 
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company they were loaned to.  With this practice, the difference in income is supplemented 
by a one-off retirement allowance.  In this way, their income is guaranteed.  If the company 
they are loaned to finds it difficult to maintain their employment, their previous employer will 
find another company to which they are loaned yet again.  This second round of the loaning 
process or status transfer is different from the first transfer, since workers loaned in this way 
lose their employment status with the first company.  One criticism is that this practice in 
effect violates the increase in the retirement age from 55 to 60, that occurs gradually from 
1994 to 2004.   
The pension reform that fixed the age at which a pension could be drawn at 65 (instead of 60 
previously), the strong incentives offered by the public authorities in order to encourage the 
employment of seniors and the problems associated with the ageing of the working 
population triggered a change in practices with regard to these works. ‘Shukko’ tended to 
produce some perverse effects, particularly in terms of the age situation in both the 
transferring and receiving companies. It led to the transfer of crucial competences acquired 
during careers spent in the same firm, while for the subcontracting firms it added to the 
imbalances in their age pyramids.   
 
4- The consequences of this mode of management for inter-generational knowledge 
transfer 
 
Both the French and Japanese companies have made constant use of age as a criterion in 
their downsizing exercises. This strategy is clearly effective in terms of the immediate 
objective of reducing costs and wages bills. On the other hand, the repeated use of these 
measures has caused specific problems in relation to medium and long-term objectives.  
After all, the early retirement of the oldest and often most experienced workers can lead to 
the loss of the knowledge and expertise that they have built up in the course of their careers. 
This may in turn destabilise the traditional practices associated with the transmission of 
crucial competences and expertise and force firms to develop new arrangements for 
transferring these crucial competences. The departure of large numbers of the employees in 
possession of this knowledge and expertise obviously does not aid the development of such 
arrangements and may restrict their effectiveness. Thus the effectiveness of the restructuring 
processes carried out in the two countries can also be measured by the effectiveness of the 
arrangements put in place for the transfer of these competences, which leads us to give 
specific consideration to the practices developed by the two firms F-I and J. 
 
4-1. Transmission by job training reactivated as knowledge codification procedures are 
launched at Fos. 
 
Traditionally in the steel industry in general and at the Fos plant in particular, new recruits 
have since the 1970s been hired regardless of category on the basis of a state-recognised 
qualification (usually a technical diploma of some sort) which also determines their pay 
grade. Their induction is the responsibility of the HR department, which provides them with 
general information on the firm and arranges for their generic knowledge to be converted into 
applied knowledge suited to the firm’s needs (vocational training provided by means of 
classes given by experienced managers within the firm). When they are allocated to a job, 
the technical supervisory staff in the workshop (foreman and then engineer) put them to work 
under the supervision of a colleague. This ‘master-apprentice’ pairing, which echoes the 
model used in craft industries, is the basis of the on-the-job training. This ‘apprenticeship’ or 
‘worker and mate’ relationship is not recognised by the human resources department. 
Nevertheless, it has enabled the plant to function since it was set up by virtue of the transfers 
of expertise from the Lorraine workers to the young workers recruited locally, which took 
place right up to the last restructuring in 2009. Its effectiveness prevented successive 
managements from putting in place a real knowledge management system. 
The suddenness of the early retirement scheme and the fact that the technical supervisory 
staff had no opportunity to identify those employees who were not indispensable to the 
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production process meant that this ‘master-apprentice’ relationship is no longer effective. 
According to the experienced workers, the training courses administered by the HRM 
department may enable the young recruits to do their jobs when all is going well, but they do 
not have the necessary skills to deal with the technical problems that frequently occur with 
ageing machinery and against a background of declining manning levels. Aware of this 
situation, management has hurriedly started to develop procedures for codifying the 
knowledge and expertise of those departing workers regarded as ‘experts’ in a particular 
sphere and has also reactivated, made official and provided financial support for the 
master/apprentice system.  
 
There was no real system for codifying and transferring knowledge at Fos before the crisis, 
mainly because of the division of the management hierarchy into two parts (HRM/technical 
function). The French system has been put in place hurriedly in response to the rapid 
departure of skilled workers and out of fear that the plant could no longer be operated. 
Despite the rush to put it in place, it is by no means certain that it is sufficient or effective at a 
time when large numbers of experienced workers are leaving.  
 
4-2. Older workers called on to transfer knowledge at Kimitsu. 
 
Traditionally, the transmission of knowledge and expertise in Japanese companies is directly 
linked to the modes of mobility and career trajectories within firms. The technical 
departments of Japanese companies are themselves responsible for organising the progress 
of each young recruit within the company in order to construct their professionality (Lanciano-
Morandat et al., 1998). Consequently, training and knowledge transfer activities are 
incorporated into the vocational training programmes and the on-the-job training provided for 
young employees by their older and more experienced colleagues.  
 
Despite the system’s effectiveness, the severity of the most recent crisis and the effects of 
transferring older workers into the peripheral workforce at Kimitsu made it necessary to take 
more active measures.  
The ‘shukko’ system had enabled the company to reduce its wages bill and to modify the age 
structure of its workforce. On the other hand, it also entailed the sudden and rapid departure 
of many workers who possessed crucial knowledge and expertise and who had, until their 
transfer, been the pillars of the system for transmitting knowledge and expertise to younger, 
less experienced employees. From 2004 onwards, the company gradually restricted these 
transfers and put forward another arrangement, known as ‘tenseki’, whereby older workers 
were to be reintegrated into the core workforce. In this re-employment system, workers who 
retire at age 60 are offered a one-year, renewable contract. In 2009, these contracts could be 
renewed annually until age 63; this upper limit is to be increased to 64 by 2012 and to 65 
after 2015, in accordance with the ‘new pension law’, which gradually raises the age at which 
pensions can be drawn. Pay levels are considerably reduced, since these employees are 
generally paid between 60 and 70% of their previous salary. On the other hand, the vast 
majority of them continue to work in the same workshop, carrying out the same functions and 
holding the same positions. The main objective of this system is to reconstruct and 
reorganise the spaces and time frames in which the intergenerational transmission of 
knowledge takes place. The reduction in these employees’ pay is justified by the decline in 
their productivity; their salary now covers only their training and skill transfer activities. The 
2009 crisis, which led to a considerable slow-down in activity, also freed up time for 
organising these training programmes. 
 
5- Towards a restructuring of labour markets in France and Japan ? 
 
Long-term analysis of the employment management systems and the adjustments in terms 
of skill management helps to observe some evolution in these ILM in France and in Japon in 
the steel industry. After all, this series of adjustments, their coherence and continuity have 
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led to changes in the structuring of internal labour markets and in the boundary between the 
internal markets in these two firms and the external market in France and Japan.   
 
Firstly, the common strategy of targeting downsizing plan at certain categories of personnel 
is a first indication of destabilisation. After all, the management of employment within an 
internal market requires long-term investment, the cost of which cannot be measured solely 
by the pay levels of the oldest workers. The stability of the employment norm, the internal 
promotion system and low employee mobility outside the internal market mean that, over the 
years, firms follow the progress of virtually an entire generation. Progression along the 
various mobility paths depends mainly on seniority. Consequently, when a firm with an 
internal market has to part with a certain number of employees because of economic 
difficulties, it is in principle the most recently hired workers who will leave first (‘last in first 
out’). (A. JOLIVET, 2003). Similarly, both firms – and this is particularly evident in the French 
case – have changed their internal employment management practices, replacing the 
administrative rules specified and organised at a centralised level with much more 
individualised arrangements that can absolutely be likened to market mechanisms.  
 
On the other hand, the ways in which the departure of this particular category of employee is 
organised and the boundaries between the various segments of the labour market reveal 
certain specificities. Examination of the transitions organised by each company for the 
employees leaving the internal market reveals that the organising principle of the internal 
market has been destabilised, although the substitute arrangements put in place obey very 
different logics. 
 
The measures taken at the Fos plant throughout the period under consideration, and 
particularly in response to the latest crisis of 2009-2010, were clearly focused on organising 
the departure of the oldest employees from the internal market and their transition towards 
the external market or retirement. These employees’ ‘destinations’ have differed depending 
on the period in question. Sometimes, the company organised and financed their transition 
into the external labour market through outplacement programmes and the establishment of 
SODIEs. On other occasions, with assistance from the public authorities or without, as in the 
current crisis, it organised transitions into inactivity or retirement. Nevertheless, while 
management in the Anglo-Saxon countries responded by shifting certain employees into the 
external labour through mass redundancies, the French plants organised transitions from 
one market to the other. Thus these labour flows, organised on the basis of age, perhaps 
reveal the existence of transitional labour markets organised in turn by the public authorities 
or by firms.    
 
The employment and skill management measures implemented at the Kimitsu plant have 
displayed less continuity. The ‘shukko’ system involved extending the boundaries of the 
internal market into subcontracting companies and subsidiaries. Employees transferred to 
these much smaller companies did indeed retain all the benefits and protections associated 
with the internal market. However, as we have seen, the use of ‘shukko’ was a major factor 
in the deterioration of relations between company J and its subcontractors: by transferring its 
older workers, it was shifting its excess labour on to these companies, thereby causing 
imbalances in the age structure of their workforce. Against this background, and faced with 
the problem of preserving skills, the introduction of the ‘Tenseki’ system was presented as an 
advance, in that it seeks to reintegrate into the internal labour market employees who no 
longer had a place either at the core or the periphery of the company and who were destined 
to be shifted into the external labour market. Nevertheless, these employees have not been 
offered stable, well-paid jobs, with career prospects, social benefits and satisfactory working 
conditions. In other words, they no longer belong to the primary market but are now 
employed in precarious, poorly paid positions with no promotion prospects that form part of 
the secondary market (Piore 1978). The company distinguishes between employees on the 
basis of age but without forcing them to compete with each other as often happens, since 
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each group performs different tasks. Thus the Japanese case shows that the internal labour 
market has been destabilised by embedding the external market in the internal market, with 
age being used as the criterion to select those to be transferred out of the primary market 
(Lefresne 2002).  
 
Conclusion  
 
Changes in organizations’ HR management policies and the strategies and practices they 
adopt with regard to the labour market may challenge the very basis of a company’s 
industrial relations. In the first downsizing regime, before the wave of rapid downsizing linked 
to the growing weight of financial actors and shareholders, management strategies differed 
depending on occupational category, position in the company or skills and qualifications. 
Today, there has been a change of paradigm that has seen the generations brought into 
opposition with each other. This shift has enabled management to make the most recent 
downsizings acceptable, since they have succeeded in confusing employees and trade 
unions alike at both Fos and Kimitsu. 
Nevertheless, these upheavals have not had the same outcomes in the two countries. The 
Fos plant has come to the end of a process that has seen it developing from a unit within a 
national company into a unit within a multinational. Kimitsu, on the other, is still protected by 
the national economic space. This does not prevent us from wondering whether, in both 
cases, the measures taken in the wake of the most recent restructurings might lead to a 
breakdown of relations between employees of different generations that has not hitherto 
existed. 
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